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I 
 
Introduction 
 
Once Keynes (1936) compared stock market with casino and discounted the 
importance of stock market for capital accumulation and growth. Joan Robinson held 
the view that financial development (one aspect of which is stock market 
development) follows growth but not the other way round. The study of World Bank 
(1993) pointed out that stock markets have played little role in the post-war 
industrialisation of Japan, Korea and Taiwan. So Singh (1997) argued that the recent 
move towards stock market liberalisation is ‘unlikely to help in achieving quicker 
industrialisation and faster long-term economic growth’ in most of the LDCs.  
Nevertheless in the present LPG regime (Liberalisation, Privatisation and 
Globalisation) the stock market has been assigned to play an important role for the 
capitalist development of the less developed countries (LDCs). Its theoretical and 
empirical support comes from a large number of mainstream economists (Levine and 
Zervos, 1998; Levine 1991 and 2003; Henry, 2000; Bekaert et al 2005).  
 
 
It is in the stock market that the stocks or shares of  the limited-liability corporations 
are usually brought or sold. It is expected that capital formation of the companies can 
be financed by selling shares to the general public.  Moreover the privatisation drive 
of the public sector companies can be facilitated by a developed stock market. There 
is a move towards globalisation of corporate governance (Sarkar, 2007) in the light of 
the findings of   La Porta et al.-LLSV- (1998). They observed that countries with a 
‘common law origin’ (such as UK) have a higher level of shareholder protection than 
countries with a civil law origin (such as France) and accordingly, in the former group 
of countries stock market flourished (Djankov, 2005). It is understood as a part of 
conventional wisdom that this stock market is the prime mover of economic 
development through capital accumulation. 
 
In this perspective the Centre for Business Research (at Judge Business School, 
University of Cambridge) has produced a comprehensive time series dataset (hereafter 
CBR dataset) for corporate governance relating to shareholder protection for 4 OECD 
countries (France, Germany, UK and USA) and India over a long period, 1970-2005, 
available online (http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/Lele-Siems-Shareholder-Index.xls). 
The coverage of the dataset is much more comprehensive than that of the LLSV (La 
Porta et al, 1998) index.  It has been constructed by a team of legal scholars based on 
the “law on the books”. It takes into account company law, and some areas of 
securities law. There are 28 broad categories and altogether 60 legal variables relating 
to shareholder protection.  Each of the variables takes a value between 0 and 1, and 
many take intermediate values. A value of 1 relates to the highest level of protection 
and a 0 to the lowest, so if a country were to have the maximum level of protection, 
the indicators would sum up to 60(their average would be 1).   
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 The analysis of these data for 4 OECD countries questions the LLSV hypothesis of 
better corporate governance in the English-law origin countries and its long-term link 
with stock market developments (Lele-Siems, 2007 and Fagernas-Sarkar-Singh, 
2007). 
 
The present paper extends that study for India and examines the nature and extent of 
legal changes relating to the protection of the shareholders of the limited-liability 
corporate sector. It provides an evaluation of this aspect of corporate governance - 
whether it leads to stock market developments and growth through capital 
accumulation (Section II). Finally some concluding observations are made (Section 
III). 
 
II 
Changes in India’s Shareholder Protection, 1970-2005 
 
Following the trail of the NEP (New Economic Policy)-regime (or the world-wide 
drive towards the LPG regime) Indian corporate governance underwent substantial 
changes to provide more and more shareholder protection.  The average1 of all the 60 
indicators (let us call it ALL60) falling into 28 broad categories (see Table 1 for the 
list) considered in the construction of the CBR dataset (details of the 60 indicators are 
available in Lele-Siems, 2007 – see also Appendix) rose from 0.47 during 1970-74 to 
0.54 during 1990-99 and finally to 0.61 during 2000-5.   
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India’s shareholder protection level is very much comparable to that of many OECD 
countries. We have a comparable dataset (constructed by CBR) for 4 OECD 
countries. The average of the shareholder protection indices of the four countries (UK, 
USA, France and Germany) - let us call it OECD4 – are plotted along with that of 
India in Figure 1. It clearly shows that India’s shareholder protection level is very 
much comparable to the four OECD countries for which we have the relevant data 
(see also Table 2).   
 
There are two broad aspects of shareholder protection - one concerning shareholder 
protection relating to board and management (‘BOARD’) and the other relating to 
protection of minority shareholders against the majority (‘MINORITY’). India’s 
shareholder protection is concerned more in the area of board and management - less 
concerned with   minority shareholder protection (Figures 2 and 3).  The index 
BOARD rose from 0.49 during 1970-74 to 0.52 during 1975-89, further to 0.55 
during 1990-99 and finally to 0.65 during 2000-5. The index MINORITY rose from 
0.43 during 1970-84 to 0.44 during 1985-89, to 0.52 during 1990-99 and finally 
declined to 0.47 during 2000-2005. In granting minority shareholder protection India 
looks somewhat behind the four OECD countries; but this is due to a rising minority 
shareholder protection in Germany (Indian scenario is comparable to that of the other 
three OECD countries). 
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Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Developments and Capital Accumulation: 
Estimates of Long-term Relationships 
 
Now the question is: apart from securing the property right of the property-owners, 
what other role the shareholder protection law plays? Djankov et al (2005) argued in 
favour of a positive influence of the shareholder protection on stock market 
developments (see also Beck et al., 2003). In the era of privatisation and 
disinvestments in the existing public sector companies, stock market development is 
one top priority of the so-called Washington Consensus. It is expected to provide a 
market mechanism for private capital accumulation (along with public sector 
disinvestments) and growth.  In the next part of this study we shall examine these 
issues through the time-series methodology. 
 
Methodology: Time-Series Analysis vis-à-vis Cross-Section Study 
 
The conventional wisdom that developed on the basis of various cross-section studies 
gives an affirmative answer to these questions addressed here. But we shall follow the 
time-series methodology. 
 
The utility of cross-section studies lies in the fact that the lack of enough observations 
per country can be overcome by increasing the number of countries in the study – 
even one single observation of a country can be utilised.  But it is often doubtful how 
far it gives a causal relationship among the variables under study. Moreover a cross-
section panel regression analysis often tries to include as many countries as possible – 
some studies cover (say) 60 countries, some covers 80 countries and all the countries 
 5
covered in the study are implicitly given the same weight (it is also difficult to devise 
a weighting system). It is difficult to justify how far one can treat a country such as 
Papua New Guinea or Ghana at par with a country such as Brazil or India. There 
always remains a scope for proving or disproving anything through a suitable choice 
of a sample.   
  
It is also doubtful how far a general result based on a cross-section study can be used 
to provide a policy prescription for a particular country.  In this respect time-series 
analysis gives better insight, particularly for individual country cases.  When enough 
data are available for a single country it is better to carry forward a case study.  The 
scope of the present study is limited to Indian experience.   
 
The study of long-run relationships between two time-series variables require a test of 
unit root – the test for the integration of the series - how many times the series are to 
be differenced to attain the stationarity property needed to carry forward a meaningful 
(as against spurious) regression analysis.  Once Nelson and Plosser (1982) argued that 
all the macroeconomic variables have unit root – they are long-memory series. In 
simple language this observation implies that a temporary shock has a permanent 
effect. The standard regression analysis is usually based on the assumption that the 
series are short-memory series – a temporary shock creates a transitory deviation from 
the path of the series. So instead of using the standard regression analysis one has to 
use cointegration approach. Subsequently the observation of Nelson and Plosser 
(1982) was questioned but it became a standard practice to conduct unit root tests 
before conducting any analysis of relationship between two variables. 
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 But the problem is that different tests of unit root often give different results and the 
lower the length of the series the lower is the power of the standard tests. The 
Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration developed by 
Pesaran and Shin (1999) does not require such pre-testing and ‘data-mining’. This 
technique can be used to test for the existence of a long run relationship between two 
variables irrespective of whether they are stationary or not (having unit root or not).  
This approach is especially suitable here as our time period is not very large. So we 
shall follow the ARDL methodology. 
 
The following is the ARDL (p, q)  equation:  
                               p             q 
(1)               Xt = a + b.t + Σ  ci Xt-i + Σ dj Yt-j 
                                                              i=1           j=0 
                                                                      
where  Xt is the dependent variable - Yt is the independent variable,  t is time trend, 
which captures the effect of other explanatory variables, and p and q are unknown 
lags to be determined by various criterion. We shall use the Schwarz Bayesian 
criterion (SBC) as suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1999).  
 
There are various aspects of corporate governance but we don’t have time-series data 
for all these.  So we concentrate only on one aspect of corporate governance- 
shareholder protection.   
 
From the Financial Structure Dataset of World Bank (available on-line), we get a 
series on the turnover ratio (TURN) over the period, 1976-2005. It is one of the most 
important indicators of stock market development. It is constructed by deflating the 
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value of stock trade by real market capitalisation and so it contains the information of 
the general price level, stock market capitalisation and also the value of stock trading. 
2 The turnover ratio series showed a tendency to decline till the mid-1990s. Thereafter 
it started rising rapidly and fell abruptly in 2001 (along with the value of stock trading 
as percentage of GDP) in the tune of dot-com bubble burst (Figure 4). So the turnover 
ratio shows no significant trend growth over the period 1976-2005 (Table 3). 
 
From the various issues of Emerging Market Economy Fact book (published by IFC, 
World Bank), we get a series on the number of firms listed in the major stock 
exchanges in India (LIST). It exhibited a rising trend up to 1990 and fell sharply in 
1991 and recovered by 1995 (Figure 5). We shall use these two (TURN and LIST) as 
the alternative indicators of stock market development. 
 
We shall examine the long-term relationship between the indicators of stock market 
development as provided by the turnover ratio or number of listed firms and the 
improvement in shareholder protection through the ARDL approach described above. 
This approach is especially suitable here as our unit root tests show that the turnover 
ratio is stationary (but not the series on listed firms) while some of the legal indices 
are non-stationary (as shown in Table 3). 3 
 
The   long run coefficients estimated through the ARDL approach are reported in 
Table 4. In no case do we get a positive long-term relationship between the share 
market development indicator - turnover ratio and the alternative legal variables – 
All60 (average of all sixty indicators), BOARD and MINORITY.  
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We have modified the ARDL equation by dropping the time trend (as it is not 
statistically significant). We have also added a spike dummy for the outlier of the 
turnover series in 2001(sp2001). It is significant in one of the models but the basic 
conclusion remains unaltered.  
 
The same conclusion follows if instead of turnover ratio we consider the series on the 
listed firms as the indicator of stock market development.  Our conclusion does not 
change if we add dummies (intercept and slope) for the period 1991-95 (both 
dummies are significant). 
 
Hence it can be concluded that the concern for better corporate governance for the 
protection of the interests of the shareholders   is misplaced so far as stock market 
developments in an LDC such as India is concerned.   
 
Next question is: why should we bother about stock market development? Is there any 
long-term relationship between stock market development and growth through capital 
accumulation? From the Economic Survey, Government of India (2006-2007), we get 
data on gross fixed capital formation –public and private as percentage of GDP over 
the period, 1950-2005.  It can be observed that in the mid-1980s (before the official 
start of the present NEP-regime), the importance of public fixed capital formation in 
GDP started declining while private capital formation continued to grow (Figure 6). 
For our purpose we shall use the series on private capital formation. Since the stock 
market turnover data are available over the period 1976-2005 and the data on the 
number of listed firms are available over the period, 1980-2003, these will be our two 
alternative periods of study.  
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Using the same ARDL methodology, we would like to examine whether there exists 
any meaningful relationship between the indicator of stock market development 
(TURN or LIST) and the private fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP 
(GPFKGDP).  
 
The estimates of the long-term coefficients show no relationship between private 
fixed capital formation (as percentage of GDP) and stock market variable, turnover 
ratio or number of listed firms (Table 5).  
  
Next we have extended the ARDL analysis to accommodate the important indicator of 
financial development – bank deposit as percentage of GDP (BDGDP) or domestic 
credit to the private sector as percentage of GDP (PCRGDP). The relevant data are 
available from the Financial Structure Dataset of World Bank over the period, 1976-
2005. Including this variable in the ARDL equation (current and past values), we get 
no change in our conclusion regarding the relationship between turnover ratio or the 
number of listed firms and private capital formation.  
 
Furthermore we got no positive relationship between private credit or bank deposit 
and private capital formation. This raises another related issue – whether financial 
development (the part of which is stock market development) matters for capital 
accumulation and growth. 
 
We have considered alternative set of intercept and slope dummies for the period 
1985-2005, 1991-99, 2000-2005, even the spike dummy for 2001 but we find no 
evidence of positive relationships. Nor do we get statistically significant dummies. 
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The CUSUM and CUSUM Squares test were conducted on the basis of OLS trend 
study of the capital formation series over the periods 1970-2005, 1976-2005 and 
1980-2003 but we got no sign of structural change in the series.  It seems that the 
increasing focus on corporate governance and stock market development under the 
NEP regime is yet to change (if at all) the trend growth path of private fixed capital 
accumulation. 
 
III. Concluding Observations  
 
Our study examines Indian experience of changes in the law governing the rights and 
privileges of shareholders of public limited companies (limited–liability corporations) 
and its impact on stock market developments. It then examines the economic 
relevance of stock markets –whether stock market developments have any favourable 
relationship with private fixed capital formation. In both cases our conclusion is in 
favour of a non-existent long-term relationship. Thus it questions the mainstream 
view –the conventional wisdom developed through the wave of works that followed 
the seminal paper of LLSV. 
 
The scope of the present study is limited – particularly we did not deal with the 
question of law enforcement.  The CBR index is based on the law on the books – not 
the actual implementation. There is a view that the rule of law is at a very miserable 
stage in many LDCs including India because of corruption and other imperfections. 
According to the different studies by World Bank (available online 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/), Indian score in regard to the rule of law is 
very low. One may be tempted to ascribe our findings to this poor rule of law.  Since 
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no long time series data are available it is not possible to include this factor into our 
analysis. Furthermore this factor does not change frequently over the years.  
 
Another important point is that the rule of law is not uniform in every sphere of Indian 
legal system. It is undoubtedly very poor in the unorganised sector involving matters 
like child labour, child marriage in remote villages, witch hunting in tribal belts, 
minimum wage legislation in the poverty-stricken regions etc. But in the organised 
sector – particularly in the matter of corporate governance the rule of law is unlikely 
to be at such a poor state as is generally believed in India and abroad. Of course big 
multinational corporations can some times bully the government (some times through 
their powerful national governments) if some laws are very much against their 
corporate interests. Nevertheless the present finding cannot be brushed aside just by 
pointing to the rule of law factor.  
  
Furthermore in the Indian context the controlled regime since the 1950s till the mid-
1980s or the beginning of the 1990s was identified in many circles as the root cause of 
all the crises of development India faced and so there was a call for de-controls 
leading to the present liberalisation regime.  This contradicts the view of poor rule of 
law. Had there been no rule of law nobody would bother whether India had controls 
or not. De jure controlled regime would have been a de facto market mechanism. The 
fact is that imperfection (in the form of corruption, bribery, dilly-dallying etc) exists 
in India but not at that level as to say that law does not matter. 
 
Keeping in mind all these, we would like to conclude that in the context of India, the 
changes in the shareholder protection law so far have no relationship with stock 
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market developments and private capital accumulation. The possible explanation for 
the lack of relationship with the stock market developments is that in most of the 
cases shares are bought only to sell at a later date to appropriate capital gains. Buying 
and selling in the stock market are often governed by speculation and/or cornering the 
market to make quick money.  These are the dominant activities in the share market 
influencing share prices, stock market capitalisation etc – almost unrelated to the state 
of shareholder protection and long-term capital formation. So the findings of our 
econometric study are not counter-intuitive. Regarding the lack of relationship with 
private capital formation, it should be noted that private capital formation depends on 
many complex factors summed up by Keynes (1936) as ‘animal spirits’. Different 
countries have different histories regarding the emergence of the capitalist class with 
different socio-economic socio-psychological and political economic complexities. 
Even a substantial change in law may not be enough to change all these.  It may not 
be surprising if the similar result is found for many other individual country cases.  
Perhaps the LLSV related literature over emphasised the importance of proper legal 
environment for capital accumulation and growth.  
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NOTES 
 
* This paper was prepared during the tenure of my visiting fellowships 
(January-March and May-June, 2007) at CBR, Judge Business School, University of 
Cambridge and was presented at the conference on 'Corporate Accountability, 
Limited Liability and the Future of Globalisation’ organised by CISD at SOAS, 
University of London (July 20-21, 2007). An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at Queens College, University of Cambridge (Political Economy Seminar 
Series – 6 February 2007). I thankfully acknowledge the encouragement and support I 
received from Professors Ajit Singh, Simon Deakin and others at CBR. However the 
usual disclaimer applies.  
 
 1  It is difficult to give weights to different indices to derive the composite 
index. Instead of giving arbitrary weights, we have given equal weight to each index. 
It implies all the sixty legal variables are equally important for shareholder protection. 
2 In the Financial Structure Dataset the turnover ratio is defined as the value of 
total shares traded to average real market capitalization. It is calculated using the 
following method:  Tt/P_at/{(0.5)*[Mt/P_et+ Mt-1/P_et-1] where T is total value traded, 
M is stock market capitalization, P_e is end-of period CPI,  P_a is average annual 
CPI. 
3 We did not try Perron test – which is the appropriate test in the presence of 
structural break in the series, as our ARDL methodology does not depend on the prior 
knowledge regarding the level of integration of the series. 
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Table 1. India’s Shareholder Protection Law: Changes during 1970-20051 
  
NO. 
 
Broad Categories  Changes  
 
 
ALL  
(1 to 60) 
[0.52] 
It rose from 0.47 during 1970-74 to 
0.49 during 1975-84, to 0.5 during 
1985-89, to 0.54 during 1990-99 and 
finally to 0.61 during 2000-5. 
   
A. 
 
Board  
(1 to 42)  
[0.55] 
It rose from 0.49 during 1970-74 to 
0.52 during 1975-84, to 0.53 during 
1985-89, to 0.55 during 1990-99 and 
finally to 0.65 during 2000-5. 
 
I. Powers of the general meeting 
[0.61]  
1  No Change(1) 
2  No Change (1) 
3  No Change (0.5) 
4  No Change (0.25) 
5  No Change (0.5) 
6  No Change (1) 
7  No Change (0) 
 
II. Agenda setting power 
[0.29]  
8  No Change (0) 
9 
 Declined from 1 to 0.75 in 1988; 
slightly improved to 0.8 in 
2001(0.88) 
10  No Change (0) 
 III. Extraordinary shareholder meeting   
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[0.75] 
11*  No Change (0.5) 
12  No Change (1) 
 
IV. Anticipation of shareholder decision 
[0.26]  
13 
 Declined from 0.5 to 0.38 in 1988 
(0.44) 
14* 
 Improved in 1985 from 0 to 0.5 and 
further to 0.88 in 2001(0.35) 
15  No Change (0) 
 
 
V. Information in the run-up of the general meeting 
[0.88]  
16  No Change (0.75) 
17  No Change (1) 
18* 
V. Shares not blocked before general 
meeting  
[1] No Change (1) 
 
VI. Individual information rights 
[0]  
19  No Change (0) 
20  No Change (0) 
 
VII. Communication with other 
shareholders 
[0.94]  
21 
 Improved in 1975 from 0.75 to 1 and 
worsened to 0.5 in 2000(0.88) 
22  No Change (1) 
 VIII. Board composition  
 18
[0.13] 
23  Improved from 0 to 1 in 2000(0.14) 
24 
 Improved from 0 to 0.25 in 1998 and 
further to 0.75 in 2001(0.12) 
25 
 Improved from 0 to 0.34 in 2000, 
further to 0.75 in 2001 and further to 
0.888 in 2002(0.13) 
 
IX. No excessive remuneration for non-
executive and executive directors 
[0.78]  
26  No Change (1) 
27 
 Improved from 0.25 to 1 in 
2001(0.35) 
28  No Change (1) 
29 
X. Performance based remuneration 
[0.5] Improved from 0 to 1 in 1988(0.5) 
 
 
XII. Duration of director’s appointment 
[0.38]  
30  No Change (0) 
31  No Change (0.75) 
 
XIII. Directors’ duties  
[0.75]  
32  No Change (0.75) 
33  No Change (1) 
34  No Change (0.5) 
 
XIV. Shareholder supremacy  
[0.47]  
35  No Change (0.5) 
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36  Improved from 0 to 1 in 1990(0.44) 
37* 
XV. Pre-emptive rights 
[1] No Change (1) 
38 
XVI. Director’s disqualification  
[0.08] Improved from 0 to 0.5 in 2000(0.83) 
39 
XVII. Corporate governance code  
[0.16] 
 
Improved from 0 to 0.25 in 1998 and 
further to 1 in 2001(0.16) 
 
XVIII. Public enforcement of company law 
[0.84]  
40  Improved from 0.5 to 1 in 1975(0.93) 
41 
 Improved from 0.75 to 1 and 
worsened to 0.25 in 1988(0.59) 
42  No Change (1) 
B 
 
Minority (43 to 60)  
[0.46] 
It rose from 0.43 during 1970-84 to 
0.44 during 1985-89, to 0.52 during 
1990-99 and finally declined to 0.47 
during 2000-5. 
43 
XIX. Quorum  
[0] No Change (0) 
 
44 
 
XX. Supermajority requirements 
[1] 
 
No Change (1) 
 
XXI. One share – one vote 
[0.85]  
45*  No Change (1) 
46  No Change (1) 
47 
 Worsened from 0.67 to 0 in 2000 
(0.56) 
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48* 
XXII. Cumulative voting  
[0.03] 
Improved from 0 to 0.25 in 2001 
(0.03) 
49 
XXIII. Voting by interested shareholders prohibited 
[0] No Change (0) 
50 
XXIV. No squeeze out (freeze out) 
[0] No Change (0) 
 
XXV. Right to exit 
[0.11]  
51*  No Change (0) 
52  No Change (0) 
53 
 Improved from 0 to 1 in 1990 and 
worsened to 0.5 in 1997 (0.32) 
54 
XVI. Disclosure of major share ownership  
[0.36] 
Improved from 0 to 0.25 in 1986 and 
further to 0.75 in 1990 (0.36) 
 
XXVII. Oppressed minority  
[0.75]  
55  No Change (0.75) 
56*  No Change (0.75) 
 
 
XXVIII. Shareholder protection is mandatory 
[0.63]  
57  No Change (1) 
58  No Change (1) 
59  No Change (0) 
60  No Change (0.5) 
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1 Indices averaged over 1970-2005 in parentheses (maximum value is 1  
And the minimum is 0). 
* Based on CBR coding these variables can be identified as the variables considered by LLSV. 
 
Source: Calculated from the CBR data available online: 
 http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/Lele-Siems-Shareholder-Index.xls 
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Table 2. Shareholder Protection Law Indices: India and Four OECD Countries, 1970-2005 
              
(Averages) 1     
_____________________________________________________________________            
-: Law Indices:- 
 
Period               ALL60     Board              Minority 
                                                                 
                  India       OECD4         India      OECD4                India      OECD4  
      
1970-74        .47         .47               .49         .46              . 43      .49  
1975-79       .49         .48               .52         .47           43      .5  
1980-84        .49         .5                 .52         .49                                .43      .52   
1985-89        .5          .52               .53         .52                     .44      .51   
1990-94        .54         .54               .55         .54                                .52      .52  
1995-99     .54         .55              .56         .57                                 .51      .5 
2000-05       .61         .6                .65         .63                                .47      .53   
 
1 Indices averaged over different sub-periods and different sub-categories (maximum value is 1 
and the minimum is 0). 
     Source: Calculated from the data available online: 
 http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/Lele-Siems-Shareholder-Index.xls 
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Table 3. India’s Shareholder Protection Law Indices, Stock Market Turnover  
Ratio and Capital Accumulation, 1970-2005: Trends and Tests of Stationarity 
 
Dependent 
Variables/  
Process1 
Intercept Time Adj. 
R Sq. 
 
D-W 
Stat. 
ADF 
Stat. 2 
ALL60      
AR (1) 0.38** 0.004** 0.92 1.86 -2.318(0) $ 
BOARD      
AR (1) 0.38** 0.005* 0.91 1.69 -1.345(0) 
MINORITY      
AR (1) 0.38** 0.002 0.82 1.91 -1.384(0)x 
Turnover Ratio3 
 (log-values), 
LTURN 
     
OLS -0.95 0.01 -0.01 1.88 -4.842(0)£ 
Listed Firms4 
(log-values), 
LLIST 
     
AR(1) 6.96* 0.03* 0.59 1.67 -2.299(0) x 
Private Capital 
Accumulation, 
GPKFGDP 
     
AR (1) 1.54** 0.02** 0.95 1.83 -2.646(0) $   
 
 
 
1 The fitted equation is: 
Y = a + b.t 
where Y is the dependent variable, t = time. 
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 Initially the regression equations are fitted through the ordinary least square (OLS) technique. A 
twelve-order Lagrange Multiplier test is conducted to ascertain the lag structure of the autoregressive 
(AR) error process and the parameters and their t-values are re-estimated (as needed) through the 
maximum likelihood process. 
 
2 The tests are based on OLS. To correct for our small sample, the Boot-strapping method (1000 
simulations) is used for testing the unit root hypothesis (through the EASYREG programme). The data-
dependent General-to-specific (GS) criterion is used to choose the optimum lag structure of the error 
process of the Dickey-Fuller equation as advocated by Ng-Perron (1995) and Perron (1997). Under this 
process, the specific order is chosen out of the general order (we considered here 12 lags) on the basis 
of the standard t-tests of significance of the lag terms. If out of 12 lag terms considered here,  the 8th lag 
(say) term is statistically significant but all higher order lag terms are insignificant we run an 8th order 
ADF equation and check whether 8th order lag is significant. If now (say) the 6th order lag term is 
significant but the higher order lag terms are insignificant, we fit a 6th order ADF equation and check 
the maximum order significant lag terms. If the 6th order lag term is significant the appropriate ADF 
model is taken to be 6th order. If not, the process continues until we arrive at the zero-order ADF (i.e. 
DF) equation. 
3 The period of analysis is 1976-2005. 
4 The period of analysis is 1980-2003. 
*      Significant at 5 per cent level.  
**  Significant at 1 per cent level. 
$    The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at 5 per cent level in favour of the trend-stationary 
alternative (based on 1000 simulations through the boot-strapping method). 
#    The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at 10 per cent level in favour of the trend-stationary 
alternative (based on 1000 simulations through the boot-strapping method). 
£     The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at 5 per cent level in favour of the mean-stationary 
alternative (based on 1000 simulations through the boot-strapping method). 
x      The null hypothesis of unit root is not rejected at 10 per cent level against the  mean-stationary 
alternative. 
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Table 4: Shareholder Protection Law and Stock Market Developments:  
Estimates of the Long-run Coefficients through ARDL Method1,  
1976-2005 
 
 ARDL model/ 
Stock Market 
Development 
Indicators/ 
Period 
 
Shareholder 
Protection  
Law 
c t Dummy-1 Dummy-2 
A. Turnover Ratio 
(LTURN), 
1976-2005 
    
(sp2001) 
 
 ALL60     
(0,1) -9.02 1.02 0.08   
(0,1) 4.92 -2.94    
(1,0) 9.38 -5.25  -5.14*  
  
BOARD 
    
(1,2) -15.52 2.56 0.14   
(1,2) 2.75 -1.67    
(1,2) 5.55 3.54  -11.91  
  
MINORITY 
    
(0,0) -8.33 1.35 0.05   
(0,0) -3.67 1.31    
(3,5) 22.54 -9.91  -16.08  
B. Listed Firms 
(LLIST), 
    
(d9195) 
 
(sd9195) 
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1980-2003 
 (ALL60)     
(1,0) -8.06 10.68** 0.05   
(1,0) -1.32 -9.27**    
(1,0) -0.9 8.73** 0.01 -14.43** 0.32** 
 BOARD     
(1,0) -1.48 8.66** 0.02   
(1,0) 0.17 8.46**    
(1,0) -1.14 8.77** 0.01 -14.04** 0.31** 
 MINORITY     
(2,2) -1.78 9.33** 0.001   
(2,2) -1.63 9.35**    
(4,1) 5.09 7.85** -0.03 -29.72** 0.65** 
 
 
*    Significant at 5 per cent level. 
 
1         The ARDL equation fitted here is the following 
 
                                                                            p             q 
Xt  = a + b.t + c.sp2001 + d.d9195 + e.sd9195 + Σ  ci Xt-i + Σ dj Yt-j 
                                                                          i = 1      j = 0 
 
 
where  Xt is the dependent variable –the log of  turnover ratio (LTURN) or the number of listed firms 
(LLIST) Yt is the independent variable – alternative shareholder protection legal indexes,  t is time 
trend which captures the effect of other explanatory variables, sp2001 is a spike dummy =1 for 2001 
and = 0 otherwise, d9195 is an intercept dummy =1 for 1991-95 and =0 otherwise, sd9195 is a slope 
dummy =d9199.t  and p and q are unknown lags to be determined by Schwarz Bayesian criterion 
(SBC) as suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1999).  
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Table 5. Private Fixed Capital Formation and Stock Market Development:  
Estimates of Long-term Relationships through the ARDL Method1, 1976-2005 
 
Period/ 
ARDL model 
 
 
Stock Market 
Development 
Indicators 
Financial 
Development 
Indicators 
c t 
1976-2005 Turnover Ratio 
(LTURN), 
Private Credit as 
% of GDP 
(LPCRGDP) 
 
 
 
(1,0) -0.03  1.34** 0.03** 
(0,0,4) -0.004 -0.005 1.29** 0.03** 
  Bank Deposit 
as % of GDP 
(LBDGDP) 
  
(0,0,1) 0.01 -0.31 0.74* 0.04** 
 1980-2003 Listed Firms 
(LLIST) 
   
(1,0) 0.11  0.67 0.02** 
(0,0,3) 0.04 0.19 1.35** 0.03** 
  Bank Deposit 
as % of GDP 
(LBDGDP) 
  
(0,0,3) 0.02 0.12 1.37* 0.03** 
 
1 The following ARDL (p, q, r) model has been fitted: 
                                                            p               q               r                              
Kt = a + b.t + Σ  bi Kt-i + Σ cj St-j  + Σ dk Bt -k 
                                                            i = 1      j = 0            k=0                       
 
where K = GPKFGDP, S = turnover ratio –log values (LTURN) or the number of listed firms –log 
values (LLIST) and B = private credit as percentage of GDP-log values (LPCRGDP) or bank deposits 
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as percentage of GDP –log values (LBDGDP); the subscripts t, t-i, t-j, t-k   indicate different time 
periods and p, q and r are unknown lags to be determined by the SBC. 
**  Significant at 1 per cent level (based on asymptotic standard errors). 
*    Significant at 5 per cent level (based on asymptotic standard errors). 
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